diversity is good for stock value. 5 Despite touting these ideals, however, boards of directors in the United States and EU are not very diverse places. For example, Enron's board had little diversity: out of fourteen board members, there was only one woman (who was also Asian) and one African American. 16 This Article argues that diverse boards are more likely to achieve the kind of active, critical thinking that independence rules are designed to achieve. To effectuate monitoring and improve corporate governance, independence must go beyond the absence of financial conflict to encompass independence of mind, diversity in viewpoint, and active discussion of alternative factual inferences and plans of action. These results are more likely-though by no means guaranteed-if the board is made up of people from diverse backgrounds and experiences.
Part I of this Article examines the theoretical and empirical bases for independence as a solution to director dereliction of monitoring duties. Part II posits that the lack of empirical support for independence as a solution to director dereliction may be due to a definitional quandary, and that defining independence as the mere absence of financial conflicts rather than as diversity of opinion may be the root of the problem. Part II turns to cognitive psychology and argues that diverse perspectives encourage better decision making. While gender and ethnic diversity are not guarantors of diversity of perspective, there are good reasons to believe that encouraging diversity will also encourage a culture of dissent, and thus improve decision making.
Part III discusses the psychology of small-group dynamics, and explains the inherent problems of group decision making in homogeneous groups. Part III suggests ways in which diversity of opinion mitigates the effects of small-group dynamics. Part IV examines the dark side of trust fostered by homogeneity, and suggests ways to overcome resistance to diversity. This Article concludes that nourishing a culture of dissent is the foundation for the kind of decision making that leads to effective monitoring, and that while gender and ethnic diversity are not guarantors of diverse viewpoints, they are a good place to start in creating the kind of board culture that will take its monitoring duties seriously.
I THE INDEPENDENCE SOLUTION TO DIRECTOR DERELICTION
SOX's principal solution regarding corporate governance was to emphasize the role of independent directors in the firm. 7 SOX accomplished this by more strictly defining independence as the absence of financial interest, by placing independent directors on audit committees in charge of the relationship between firms and their auditors, and by putting the audit committees in charge of monitoring a system of internal accounting controls-put in place by the chief executive and chief financial officers-to ensure that the flow of information reaches the audit committees.' 8 Because SOX applies to foreign issuers as well as domestic ones, this regulatory response created a furor abroad, with accusations of regulatory imperialism.' 9 At first, the EU said U.S.-type scandals could not happen in Europe. Then along came scandals involving Vivendi (France), Ahold (Netherlands), Adecco (Switzerland), Elan (Ireland), and Parmalat (Italy), all involving financial misrepresentations missed by corporate boards. The EU Finance Ministers called for action and issued a report calling for independent directors to control audits, executive compensation, and selection of directors.
Although the European Commission Action Plan rejected the idea of an EU corporate-governance code, advocating instead a broad framework with member flexibility and mutual recognition, 1 the OECD corporate-governance principles similarly stress the importance of nonexecutive directors. 2 The EU now uses a principles-based approach with companies subscribing to corporate-governance standards and disclosing areas of noncompliance. 23 Whether in the United States or EU, some features of corporate governance are relatively uncontroversial. Almost universally, corporations are supposed to be managed by, or 24 under the direction of, the board of directors. A key feature of the board is that it acts as a group in its decision-making processes, including its primary function of monitoring firm management. But while there has been substantial convergence on the importance of board monitoring, the structure and membership of boards vary greatly. Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, as well as some other EU countries, employ a two- 20 See HIGH tiered board system. 2 Employee-elected representatives, as well as shareholder-elected members, sit on the supervisory board. 26 The supervisory board monitors, while the management board manages the firm. 7 At first glance, this is quite a different system from the unitary board system of the United States and United Kingdom. However, in the unitary system the functions of monitoring and managing are separated by the delegation of certain critical decisions to committees of independent directors, such as the audit, compensation, and nominating committees.
28
The requirement of director independence is problematic in some countries, such as Germany, where the supervisory board 29 must by law include employees. Pre-SOX, audit committees were unusual in many countries. SOX's requirement that the audit committee hire, fire, and oversee the auditors is problematic in countries such as Italy and Japan, where only the
shareholders may retain the auditor. SOX's requirement of audit committee control became quite controversial, and as a result of the controversy, the SEC created a few exemptions for foreign issuers-primarily to accommodate the structural problems in Germany, Japan, and Italy-as long as issuers disclose their reliance on the exemption and assess whether and how their reliance on the exemption affects their ability to comply with the other regulations. 3 ' This is an approach similar to that of a minority of EU members, which require companies to disclose and explain any failures to comply with corporate governance codes. 32 Despite the protests, EU member states actually have fallen into line with SOX requirements. Two of the EU members with the largest markets, France and Germany, more or less have transplanted SOX into their own corporate-governance codes.
France, in July 2003, adopted provisions similar to SOX regarding independent directors, audit committee independence, and an annual corporate-governance statement specifying how the board functions and its control procedures. 33 Germany too has adopted a ten-point action plan. 34 In response to the Parmalat scandal, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on corporate governance, encouraging the presence of independent directors. 3 5 French and UK boards increased their percentage of independent board members.
Moreover, in 31 SOX section 404 will apply to foreign filers issuing public securities in the United States; however, it is unclear how foreign filers will solve the problems of section 404 certification requirements if they have audit committees that do not comply with either voluntary codes or SOX. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Financial Services Authority adopted a Combined Code 
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response to the accounting scandals at Parmalat and Ahold, the EU's 8th Company Law Directive on statutory audit requires a listed company to set up an audit committee with independent members to select and oversee the auditor and auditing 37 process.
A. What Is Independence?
Long before the enactment of SOX, U.S. corporations had 38 been moving toward independent boards.
Corporate best practices recommended boards with "a majority of directors who are free of any significant relationship ... with the corporation's senior executives., 39 The definition of "significant relationship" included the firm's principal outside law firm, investment bank, and customer/supplier relationships above $200,000. 4 0 The NYSE listing rules now require that the independent director have "no material relationship with the listed company" as a "partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company" and address the effects of prior employment, family ties, and consulting and charitable relationships. 41 Although the current standards for director independence offer a stricter and more comprehensive definition of independence than the prior standards, they still focus on financial ties and say nothing about the close social ties between directors and management. 43 CEOs, even where firms have independent nominating committees, still heavily influence board selection."
New SEC rules attempt to diminish this influence by requiring disclosure of nominating committee practices with respect to the committees' search and evaluation
45
processes. However, the role of the CEO in recommending directors to the nominating committee means that many directors-independent though they may be-will be reluctant to voice dissent for fear of being asked to resign. 4 6 Moreover, the social connections between even financially independent board members and CEOs can undermine active monitoring of the firm. 47 
B. What Independence Is Supposed to Achieve
The basic risk created by the separation of ownership and control is that those in control will line their pockets at the investors' expense, diverting funds or shirking in their efforts. 48 This classic agency problem can be solved, in theory at least, by monitoring the firm's managers. Monitoring may be achieved by shareholders or their representatives. Whoever does it, the effectiveness of the monitoring has repercussions not only on the individual firm and its shareholders, but on society as a whole. 49 Without trust in the corporate-governance system, the economy will stagnate. It is a truism that economic growth and financial development depend on the willingness of investors to trust their funds to the management of others. 5°H owever, monitoring is costly. Where there is a controlling shareholder block, controlling shareholders have incentives to monitor effectively. 5 ' The downside of monitoring by controlling shareholders, however, is their ability to extract rents beyond the costs of monitoring. 52 This feature of rent extraction makes it more difficult to sell minority shares. Thus, one cost of a system where large blockholders or controlling shareholders monitor, such as in the continental EU, is diminished liquidity.
At Independent boards are supposed to improve monitoring because, in theory at least, they will be less willing to rubber stamp management policies and more willing to consider alternative courses of action. Thus, independent boards are meant to improve corporate governance through more active board monitoring. Whether this in fact occurs is subject to considerable debate.
C. Is Independence the Solution to Director Dereliction?
In the United States, a string of corporate disasters in which management wrongdoing was ignored or abetted by boards precipitated the congressional action resulting in SOX. 5 Crossing's board of directors was co-opted by its CEO).
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governance.
But whether independent directors actually improve monitoring is questionable. 57 While in theory one would think that having fewer ties to management ought to foster the monitoring process, there are some nagging facts to the contrary. For instance, both Enron
58
and WorldCom had mostly independent boards. Indeed, long before the advent of SOX and the new listing rules, most large, publicly held corporations already had independent boards. 59 Most also had independent audit committees. 6° Thus, while one might argue that a strong, independent board will pick audit committee members willing to take the auditor's side in a dispute with management, there is little evidence of this occurring in real life. ( asserting that "independence of audit committees may be affected by the independence of the board in general" and contending that "there is at least the potential that stronger boards in general will seek out [audit committee] members who are willing to confront management to a greater degree than previously.., documented").
[Vol. 86, 373 of outside directors (two of whom had financial expertise), and Enron was repeatedly on Fortune's list of best-managed companies. 62 Nor would SOX have fixed the problems at Parmalat: its EUR 1.5 billion in undisclosed debt (funneled into the CEO's son's soccer team and his daughter's travel business)
were all missed by independent auditors, creditors, and financial
63
analysts .
There is some indication that a higher percentage of outside directors decreases the occurrence of financial fraud. Examining the relationship between corporate-governance measures and financial misstatements, Professors Anup Agrawal and Sahiba Chadha found no relation between the probability of financial restatements and either board independence, audit committee independence, or auditor conflicts. 66 Agrawal and Chadha did find, however, that the probability of a restatement is 62 See Gordon, supra note 58, at 1241. 63 significantly lower in companies whose boards or audit committees include an independent director with financial expertise. 67 But mere accounting expertise does not appear to correlate with willingness to challenge management's position in a dispute with an auditor, although audit experience apparently does increase such support. 68 There are other troubling aspects of relying on independence to remedy directors' monitoring failures. A number of recent studies report a negative correlation between the proportion of 69 independent directors and firm performance. When it comes to setting CEO compensation, independent directors seem to make little difference; 7 0 having a high level of independence appears, counter-intuitively, to correlate with high executive compensation. 71 In fact, change-in-control severance payments (known as golden parachutes) actually increase with independent boards. 7 2 In addition, studies by Professor Mark 67 Id. Under SOX, to qualify as a financial expert "the Commission shall consider whether a person has, through education and experience as a public accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting officer of an issuer," sufficient experience. SOX, supra note 1, § 407(b 74 This may be due to the fact that audit committees typically meet only two or three times a year, and while the board as a whole typically meets six or seven times a year, it has other issues besides financial reporting on its agenda. 75 Independent directors spend relatively little time on thei boad •76 their board duties. Moreover, even when the audit committee is composed solely of independent directors, management asserts a considerable influence over the quality of the interactions between the audit committee and the external auditor. 7 As for independence as a cure-all, one recent study finds that the presence of a chief financial officer ("CFO") on the board actually decreases the likelihood of financial fraud. 80 Because the independent board members normally will set the CEO's pay, the CEO has an incentive to paint a positive picture, favorably skewing information reaching them. 8 '
Although audited financial reports ought to provide a check on management misinformation, auditors also get their information from management, and risk-management accounting means that only those items deemed high risk for the 82 business are checked regularly outside the firm. Finding financial fraud is quite difficult, even for seasoned, independent 83 auditors. Noting "the inherent limitations of any outside party to discover the presence of fraud," a report by the six largest accounting firms urges that periodic forensic accounting be required rather than simply relying on the quarterly or annual auditing process. 84 Moreover, the willingness of audit committee (either theoretically or empirically) for the conventional wisdom that either an increased presence of outsiders on the board of directors or the increased ownership stakes by any shareholder group (including management) necessarily improve corporate performance").
80 Hence the protestations of the Enron board members that they knew nothing about the dire straits of the corporation and that management withheld key information from them. See POWERS, JR. ET AL., supra note 55, at *6. members to challenge management in disputes with auditors is questionable. 85 The Enron directors had a sophisticated compliance program, which should have funneled information to the (mostly independent) directors and the (completely independent) audit committee; the directors either ignored its requirements or ignored the information that they had obtained. Perhaps the lack of empirical support for the regulatory emphasis on director independence can be traced to a definitional quandary.
Although the purpose of the independence requirement is to foster objective monitoring of the firm, the emphasis has been on director disinterest rather than on independence of thought. Disinterest has been interpreted as the absence of financial ties as well as the absence of conflict between duty and self-interest. 87 There is more to independence than mere financial disinterest, however. The NYSE listing rules appear to recognize the influence of social ties and group interactions in the requirement that the independent board members meet separately to evaluate management performance and shareholder concerns. 88 of relational teams, like boards of directors, develop strong internal relationships and engage with each other repeatedly. This is the kind of situation that evolutionary game theory suggests produces cooperative strategies, which may devolve into collusion. 89 Even independent directors have repeat interactions not only with each other, but also with management and the other directors-a situation ripe for fostering collusion and subverting control mechanisms.
It is for this reason that the emphasis on independence rather than diversity of viewpoint is misplaced. Financial independence alone is not enough for effective monitoring, nor is it enough to abolish familial ties or those social ties that amount to indirect financial interest. 9 0 What is needed for an effective board is a mix of people who can provide access to information, critical thinking about the information presented, active voicing of alternative courses of action, and some way of reaching consensus. That is what I mean by a culture of dissent.
Rather than mere financial disinterest, and separate meetings for discussions of sensitive issues such as executive compensation and audits, independence should mean independence of thought, and a willingness to voice dissent.
Independent thinking prevents errors from being correlated, prevents group polarization skewing the decision in the same direction, and increases the likelihood that someone in the group will have new information. "The smartest groups ... are made up of people with diverse perspectives who are able to stay independent of each other." 9 ' That boards of directors not only interact with each other regularly, but usually come from the same background, social strata, and educational institutions are critical reasons to advocate diversity in the boardroom. That diverse boards make better decisions is not a new observation, 01 but it is an important justification for reform, since corporations are managed by, or under the direction of, boards of directors. It seems intuitive that individuals with diverse perspectives and backgrounds will enlarge the scope of any discussion, considering alternatives and bringing more information to the table.'°2 People with different backgrounds have not only different perspectives, but varied approaches to assessing information, which should, in theory at least, lead to better decisions. For example, if the predominantly white-male CEOs of Fortune 500 companies are right about the differences in male and female traits 1 0 3 (and putting aside the question of whether these stereotypes are justified), adding a female perspective only could help make more balanced decisions. Diversity of thought is important to the quality of board discussions, and this diversity of experience means that women and minorities raise new issues for board consideration based on their unique experiences. '°4 -EuropeCorpGovOutlook.pdf (noting that while the statistics show a 22% increase in the number of women on boards, it is up from the low base of 6% in 2003). Indeed, the Canadian experience with diverse boards is revealing. A study by the Conference Board of Canada found that 94% of boards with at least three women ensured compliance with internal conflict-of-interest guidelines, while only 68% of all-male boards complied.' 1 5 Diverse boards also assumed corporate-governance responsibilities with greater frequency, which, together with numerous other examples of how diverse boards functioned, led the Canadian Report to conclude that diversity "does change the functioning and deliberative style of the board in clear and consistent ways.
1 0 6
A recent study by the Wellesley Centers for Women concludes that not only do women on the board make a difference, but the number of women matters.' 0 7 When there is only one woman on a board, her view represents "a woman's point of view," and may be disregarded by her fellow board members. But on boards with three or more women, the female board members are treated as individuals, with divergent points of view that can have a more substantive effect on board decision making. 1 ' 9 The Wellesley study found that having a critical mass of women directors enhances board decision making by changing board dynamics and raising different issues, so that difficult issues were less likely to be ignored, and the content of the discussion was more likely to include perspectives of multiple stakeholders."° One CEO identified "more transparency with diversity... and people express opinions in a clearer way. ' diversity of thought to the quality of board discussions and linked diversity of thought to different categories of diversity, including gender, race/ethnicity, national origin, field of interest, and position"). 106 Id. at ii. 107 See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 104, at iv-v (concluding that "a critical mass of three or more women can cause a fundamental change in the boardroom and enhance corporate governance"). 108 Id. at 18. 109 See id. at 34. 110 See id. at 9 (finding that a majority of directors and CEOs interviewed "mentioned that women directors raise different kinds of issues than men do").
I" Id. at8.
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III GROUP DYNAMICS
In addition to the empirical studies that cast doubt on independence as a solution to board dereliction, cognitive psychology gives some insight into why merely removing conflict of interest may not solve the problem of director dereliction. Although market theorists have demonstrated that repeat players in the markets show what James Surowiecki terms "the wisdom of crowds,'
' 1 2 not all group decisions are good ones. Interactive groups are especially subject to polarization effects, herding, and information cascades. Diversity in the makeup of the group should ameliorate these problems. The importance of diversity-in the sense of different life experiences, skills, and cognitive approaches-is that it adds new perspectives that would otherwise be absent and mitigates some of the effects of small-group dynamics.1 13 One anomalous tendency of group decisions is that groups often polarize; that is, the group will make more extreme decisions than the initial position of any individual in the group would have predicted.
14 The result is that group decisions tend to coalesce around an extreme position rather than around the middle of the individually held antecedent positions.' 5 This is more acute when the group is homogeneous, such as within the upper echelon of corporate management, because if group members share a particular bias, polarization may magnify its impact. The tendency of directors to share the same social and educational backgrounds, ethnicity, and gender makes sharing 112 See SUROWIECKI, supra note 91, at XIV, 29-30 (noting the ease with which "a few biased individuals ... exert undue influence and skew the group's collective decision"). [t] he effect of deliberation is both to decrease variance among group members, as individual differences diminish, and also to produce convergence on a relatively more extreme point among predeliberation judgments"). particular biases-and therefore polarization-more likely. Because of the phenomenon of group polarization, both risk aversion and risk preference may be magnified in group decisions.' ,6 Thus, while random errors of individuals should be cancelled out by other random errors in a group process, they are not if the errors are skewed in the same direction.
Moreover, even a small shift in the heterogeneity of the group can have a large impact on the group's behavior. Disagreement from even one persistent individual will force the group to discuss the issue more thoroughly than it otherwise would. 1 8 But a lone member of a minority demographic group that historically has held less power or social status is not likely to express that dissent. 1 9 While a second minority group member may improve this situation somewhat, three members appear to create a supportive environment that makes a real DECISION PROCESSES 201,210 (1996) . Nonetheless, despite our ignorance about whether the results in the general-knowledge questions are equally applicable to the decisions directors make, if our goal is to optimize decision making, we should implement ways of minimizing such effects.
129 See Blanton et al., supra note 128, at 373 (2001) (citing studies asking people to evaluate their ability in solving laboratory problems and showing that "people think that they can solve problems that they cannot, think that they have made progress toward correct solutions when they have not, and think that they have drawn correct conclusions when they have not"). 130 See FESTINGER, supra note 127, at 18-24.
and voters are more confident after they have placed their bets or votes than they were before.' 3 '
In addition, the social environment of board deliberations may increase overconfidence, because greater overconfidence has been demonstrated in people acting within small social networks.
132 These networks are characterized by having: three to fifteen members, a characteristic many boards of directors share; someone in a central, coordinating position, such as the chair-generally the CEO; and weak contact with outsiders, at 133 least during the decision process.
A. How Polarization Affects Homogeneous Groups
Rather than fracturing the group into opposing views, polarization is a consensual shift further in the direction of the group's initial tendency. 3 For polarization to occur, there must
be an initial leaning of the group in a particular direction. This kind of predilection is more common if the group is homogeneous. For example, when there is an underlying norm endorsing management positions, individuals attempt to signal 856-58 (1999) (explaining the concept of group polarization in terms of a choice shift, which occurs "when, after a group's interaction on an issue, the mean final opinion of group members differs from the members' mean initial opinion... in the opposite direction of the initial inclination of the group"). average is, the value moves in the direction favored by the group norm. In studies where a group categorized itself as either risk taking or cautious, group decisions polarized in the risky direction by stereotypically risk-seeking groups and in the cautious direction by self-perceived cautious groups, although risky and cautious individuals tended to shift away from their individual predilection. 137 Apparently, this polarization phenomenon is a function of group discussion.
138
In interactive groups, rather than responding to information against their position by modifying their position or lowering their confidence, group members' interaction increases individuals' confidence in their decisions in a way that is not justified by increased accuracy.! Instead, group members frequently fail to respond to the information presented.
14 0 Thus, in a group with a strong predilection toward a particular result, having some group members who oppose the central tendency will not prevent polarization, although larger shifts occur in groups of like-minded people.
One explanation for group polarization is that groups have an internal culture that prefers some values over others. 142 This too is more likely if the group is homogeneous. During discussion, of the group in advance will ensure that arguments/positions/members in line with the stereotype will tend to be perceived as more representative of the group as a whole and hence more persuasive and valued").
138 BARON ET AL., supra note 136, at 73 (noting the "process whereby group discussion tends to intensify group opinion, producing more extreme judgments among group members than existed before discussion"). DECISION PROCESSES 305, 306 (1995) (arguing that interaction does not cause people to assess the available information differently but merely to develop more coherent rationales for their choices and beliefs). Heath and Gonzalez studied interactive decision making-individual decisions made after consultation with the group-and distinguished it from group decision making on the basis that groups must reach a consensus and the "aggregation procedure may hide or distort changes in individual preferences." Id. at 307. 140 See id. at 305. 141 See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 222-26 (1986) (discussing studies on group polarization). 142 See Baron & Roper, supra note 136, at 528-30.
group members attempt to signal their adherence to these group norms, but because they do not know ahead of time the level of group adherence to the norms, the result is a competition that shifts the initial preferences to a more extreme level. 143 This means that, if group members share a particular bias, group dynamics may intensify its impact.' 44 People wish to be perceived favorably by the group, so they adjust their expressed opinion in line with their image of the group position, an image already polarized because of its prototypical nature. 45 Another explanation for the polarization effect is that the initial declaration of the individual's position was more moderate than the position the individual really held.' 46 During group deliberations, as the individual realizes the group position is more extreme, the individual is freed to express these more extreme views. 47 In this explanation, there is not really a shift in underlying attitudes, but merely an increased willingness to express previously held views. Both this and the preceding explanation are social comparison theories, and suggest that group polarization occurs when high-status members of the group hold more extreme views than the mean. 48 Thus, if the CEO has a predilection for a particular view, that may shift the group decision.
Yet another explanation for group polarization is the 
B. Cohesion and Trust
Group behavior is even more complicated to study than individual behavior. 53 One problem with group studies conducted in the laboratory is that such groups typically consist of strangers who meet in the laboratory, without past or future relationships, to perform a decision task.1 54 The studies fail to capture the complex dynamic interactions of people who interact as a group over time.
5 5 Indeed, a work group is defined as:
[Miade up of individuals who see themselves and who are seen by others as a social entity, who are interdependent because of the tasks they perform as members of a group, who are embedded in one or more larger social systems (e.g., community, organization), and who perform tasks that affect others (such as customers or coworkers).
156
In the corporate board context, group dynamics include not only the need to accomplish group projects, such as monitoring management, but also the satisfaction of members' needs and the maintenance of the group as an ongoing system. 157 Trust is more easily fostered in homogeneous groups. Indeed, groups experience enormous pressure to maintain cohesiveness. 16 Group members form an independent social entity embedded in a larger social system (e.g., an organization), whose decisions affect people outside the group, such as the managers they monitor or the shareholders for whom they are supposed to monitor.1 6 ' As a result of this pressure, even independent boards may fail to realistically assess alternative courses of action.
162
Rather than making a collective decision resulting from many independent judgments, people in a small group influence each other's judgments. This makes decisions of small groups more volatile and extreme. Consensus becomes more important than dissent because dissent threatens the group's cohesion. Thus, the effects of polarization may be even greater for homogeneous boards that interact over many years.
Moreover, the initial speaker-generally the CEO-frames the discussion. 163 This can be crucial for the decision-making 159 See Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 2200 (noting the fear that distrust will decrease cooperation between management and the board). 163 Framing effects are the tendency of people to process information according to the way it was presented, rather than on its merits. When the same problem is expressed in two different ways, the same people often make radically different choices. For example, both patients and physicians reverse their decisions about treatment when the same information is presented as survival rates versus mortality rates. process. A meta-analysis of framing effects found that when a problem was framed in terms of gains, subjects chose the sure gain in over 60% of the studies, whereas subjects chose the risky gain in only 40% of the studies.'64 When the problem was framed as losses, the results were reversed.
16
Moreover, framing effects are durable; they persist even after their inconsistencies are explained to people. 66 However, adding pertinent social context information, that is, more relevant facts about the decision, can affect the way people respond to these effects. 67 Thus, adding diverse views that may make information about social context available for discussion may improve group decision making.
And this brings us to an important caveat on the role of diversity on corporate boards: it must be true diversity. Neither race nor gender are necessarily a proxy for diversity of viewpoint. Having women and minorities on the board who mimic white male traits and attitudes will do little to achieve diversity. But people who replicate the attitudes of existing reversed their treatment preferences depending on how the options were framed). For a discussion of the research on framing effects, see ERICA BEECHER-MONAS, EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 168-202 (2007) . Framing effects also occur in social-dilemma games, such as the prisoner's dilemma, where the players are told at the outset of the game, either explicitly or implicitly, to cooperate or compete. The economic payoffs remain the same; nonetheless, players told to cooperate (or who are told they are playing a "community game") are more likely to cooperate, and players told that they are competing (or who are told that they are playing a "Wall Street game") are more likely to defect. 169 See Langevoort, supra note 158, at 1631 (predicting that "any diversity that is pursued will be women and minorities who mimic white male traits, including negative stereotyping of other women and minorities").
170 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-33, 343 (2003) (endorsing business rationales for diversity as "real" rather than "theoretical," and noting the importance of critical mass for the voicing of different opinions).
171 Not all diversity scholars agree that critical mass is what we should be aiming for. For example, Professor Gerken argues for a system that she calls "second order" diversity, in which diversity among institutional bodies is encouraged rather than diversity within each body. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1108 (2005) (discussing tradeoffs in defining diversity as statistically mirroring the population and in defining diversity as variation among decision-making bodies rather than within them). Whatever the benefits (and costs) to democracy of applying this concept to juries and electoral districts, Professor Gerken recognizes the importance of group dynamics and the key role that vocal dissent plays in ameliorating polarization, social cascades, and conformity. Id. at 1191-92. She argues that while ensuring the presence of dissenters in each decision-making body may improve each body's decision making, it may result in less dissent in the aggregate. Id. at 1192. Perhaps, but since we are a long way from having minorities on many boards, never mind having boards composed entirely of minorities at the helms of Fortune 500 companies, this is largely an academic debate.
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C. The Role of Disagreement
Two things appear to improve the performance of small groups: the active discussion of dissenting opinions, and aggregating the final decision (as in a blind vote). 72 The importance of diversity-in the sense of different life experiences, skills, and cognitive approaches-is that it adds new perspectives that otherwise would be absent and that it mitigates some of the effects of small-group dynamics. 173 Groups that are too much alike stagnate because they become increasingly less 174 able to investigate alternative solutions.
Although a group of diverse dummies cannot be expected to reach better collective decisions than a single smart expert, a group whose members possess a variety of skills, knowledge, and aptitude will outperform a small group of experts. Collective decisions that are achieved through disagreement and contest are superior to those achieved through consensus or compromise.1 76 Expressing dissent can improve the group's innovation.
Creativity is also fostered in groups with active dissenters. 17 And consideration of alternative solutions to a problem is more likely in a group where there is active dissent. 179 Moreover, where there is active disagreement among the group members before a decision is reached, more information is discussed during the decision-making process. 180 Diversity is important because it prevents errors from being correlated and skewing the decision in the same direction, and because it increases the likelihood that someone in the group
will have new information. This is a particular problem for boards of directors, who not only interact with each other regularly, but usually come from the same background, social strata, and educational institutions. 182 In an information cascade, decisions are made by people following the decisions of those around them rather than relying on their own private information. Although it is normal and frequently beneficial to imitate the actions of others, and perhaps we are even genetically predisposed toward imitation, imitation can be disastrous, as evident from market bubbles. 83 According to the financial commentator James Surowiecki, the problem arises from sequential decision making, and can be mitigated by simultaneous decision making. 184 Procedures for "secret ballots" in director voting might increase the influence of diverse perspectives and help board members stay independent of each other (and the CEO), thus improving the quality of board decisions.
IV THE DARK SIDE OF TRUST
Trust increases cohesiveness, making group deliberations quicker and more harmonious. But it has a dark side. Decisions become less careful, more overconfident, and more extreme. That dark side manifests itself in the tendency of groups to reproduce themselves, hiring replicants of the members. Real diversity enhances decision making, but real diversity is still a long way off in corporate America, as well as in the EU. Despite the optimistic predictions of the increased productivity and profitability that would follow the elimination of discrimination, discrimination has not yet withered away.
1 8 5 Why not? It appears that there is tension between the efficiencies of improved decision making and the productivity of a group that shares common traits and backgrounds.
Diversity threatens cohesion. This problem creates resistance to diversity. Cohesion may make work more productive, or at least faster, but it threatens good decision making. Empirical data suggest that the best performing firms are those with a culture of dissent.18 6 So even with diverse boards in place-still largely a pipe dream-a culture of dissent must be nourished for diversity to have an effect. Given people's aversion to forces that destroy cohesiveness and trust, what can be done to achieve this culture of dissent? Some governments mandate diversity: Norway requires that 40% of board positions go to women. While such a requirement probably is not politically feasible in the United States, Professor Susan Sturm suggests that real diversity is achievable in the boardroom, as well as the workplace, by 185 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 158, at 1622-23 (observing that if discrimination is inefficient, "patterns of discrimination should wither away as competition forces its elimination" unless there is insufficient competition or there are "positive efficiencies to discrimination"). 
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implementing systems designed to overcome the harmful effects of the tournament structure of promotin.88 For example, at Deloitte & Touche, a major accounting and investment banking firm, concern from the CEO about the firm's inability to keep women at higher levels despite equivalent hiring levels led to institutionalizing a process of data collection and problem solving.
189
Ultimately, this process enabled Deloitte to counter what it had identified as the three major obstacles to women's retention and promotion: a maledominated culture that perpetuated stereotypes and assumptions about women; systems for advancement that worked for men but not women; and the need for a more balanced work-life approach.
0
After instituting the process, the percentage of women admitted to partnership rose and the turnover rate for female senior managers fell. 91 Similarly, the successes of internal programs at Intel and Home Depot emphasized data collection, objective benchmarks for promotion, and support from the highest levels in the firm. This kind of initiative is important, not only for the workplace, but in achieving a diverse boardroom. Board members are frequently the CEOs of other firms.
One way to change board culture is to make sure firms are implementing systems that promote diversity rather than systems that obscure discrimination. Developing metrics and requiring disclosure of progress in diversity are first steps. Currently, firms must disclose, among other things, whether they 188 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459-62 (2001). The tournament structure of promotion was a concept illuminated by Professor Langevoort, who argued that there is an iterated corporate tournament for positions at the top of the corporate hierarchy, and that the tournament is won by self-confident, aggressive risk-takers, who are both loyal and opportunistic, and disinclined to "worry about relationships, commitments, or ethical distractions when there is a good reason to move on." Langevoort, supra note 158, at 1627-30. Anyone with a different point of view will slow things down, and impede the formation of trust. See id. at 1630. This is not, as Langevoort acknowledges, to suggest any inevitability in the tournament; it is obviously a social construct. Id. at 1631. But the tournament provides the system with an automatic tilt that is gender biased, and may be extremely resistant to change. Id.
189 Sturm, supra note 188, at 492-93 (2001).
have a nominating committee, what its charter is (if any), whether the members are independent, whether the committee has any policy with respect to consideration of candidates, and whether shareholder recommendations will be considered. Although board membership is disclosed (which generally serves to inform investors of the gender diversity, if not the racial diversity, of the board), there is no requirement to disclose efforts to achieve diversity. Since, as the truism of managerial courses would have it, you manage what you measure, quantifying efforts toward diversity should improve accountability. More qualified women and minorities at the top of the corporate ladder should ultimately yield more diverse boards. But this may take time, and what are we to do in the meantime?
One possibility is to ensure that nominating committees engage in a process similar to the one developed by Deloitte, in which outside and inside advisors engage in an interactive system of collecting data about barriers to entry and addressing those barriers. Deloitte, for example, worked with two outside nonprofit research centers, Catalyst and the Center for Gender in Organizations, to help it analyze both gender problems in the workforce and gender problems' connection to strategic objectives and organizational performance. 93 Together, the three organizations then worked interactively with management to institute systems to collect data, pool information, develop and evaluate standards, and improve accountability. 94 Nominating committees charged with disclosure and data collection may also be able to increase diversity on corporate boards.
As the Wellesley and Canadian studies suggest, increasing board diversity significantly to achieve a critical mass of diverse board members should bring new views and perspectives to the board, along with improved communication and better decision making. 
CONCLUSION
Apparently unrelated, the international efforts toward independence and diversity on corporate boards both 193 See id. at 526. 194 
Id.
195 See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
acknowledge that only active, open-minded thinking about the problems of the firm will improve monitoring. While absence of financial conflicts may be an obvious first step in improving board decision making, the empirical data show that independence is far from the last word in improving governance. As long as directors come from the same narrow pool of socially tied and ethnographically indistinguishable people, it will be difficult to achieve the range of experience and perception that goes into active, open-minded thinking. Nourishing a culture of dissent requires respect for differences.
In sum, the reason to nourish diversity is to achieve the better boards that independence of thought should foster. On grounds such as better decision making, increased profitability, increased creativity, and better morale, corporations around the world have articulated the need for diversity. Putting these words into practice, however, is proceeding at a glacial pace. One of the impediments to achieving diverse boards is the difficulty of resolving the tension between cohesiveness and the intellectual promise of diversity and dissent. To resolve this tension will require more than rhetoric.
The business community has embraced the idea-if not yet the reality-of diversity. Understanding the importance of these goals should help corporations put into action systems that will enable boards to achieve the diversity and independence they espouse. Disclosure of steps taken toward this goal would be a valuable first step.
